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The name David Andrew Graff is familiar to those interested in premodern Asian 
military  history.  The  sinologist  author  has  studied  warfare  in  medieval  China  
throughout his academic career and since 1998 has been the editor of the Journal 
of  Chinese  Military  History  and secretary of  the Chinese Military History Society.  
In 2002, he published a fundamental monograph on medieval Chinese warfare in 
the series Warfare and History published by Routledge.1 A professor at Kansas State 
University, he is an acknowledged authority on Chinese military history.
The  significance  of  the  monograph  reviewed  here,  The  Eurasian  Way  of  War.  
Military Practice in Seventh-Century China and Byzantium, extends beyond East Asian 
or  Chinese  military  history.  It  attempts  to  answer  questions  of  technology  transfer  
and warfare, such as the spread of military innovations, and questions the validity of 
regional ways of war by comparing seventh-century Byzantine and Tang warfare.
The book raises  a  bold question in  comparing late  antique military  manuals  
from  empires  located  at  the  opposite  edges  of  the  Old  World.  The  two  key  texts  
are the Strategikon, written at the turn of the seventh century and attributed to the 
emperor  Maurice,  and  a  lost  Chinese  military  manual  (Li  Jing  bingfa)  by  a  sev-
enth-century Tang general,  Li Jing, which has survived only in extracts.  Graff did 
even more: he exhaustively described seventh-century Chinese and Byzantine war-
fare and attempted to explain the convergence of these two independent systems.
Consequently, the book is of interest not only to military historians but also to 
researchers  interested  in  global  connectivity,  interactions  between the  steppe  and 
the sown, and the history of technology. The positive reception of this monograph 
1  Graff,  Medieval Chinese Warfare.
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by scholars in the fields of Mongolian studies,2 Chinese-Türk cultural relations,3 late 
antique history4 and military history5 illustrates its popularity in various disciplines. 
The  structure  of  the  monograph  is  logical  and  practical,  consisting  of  seven  
chapters: the first historiographical chapter on the relationship between war and cul-
ture is followed by a presentation of the seventh-century Chinese (Sui and early Tang) 
and Byzantine armies, highlighting their resources, weaponry, and tactics (chapters 
2 and 4). The second half of the book offers interpretative answers to the above ques-
tions, emphasizing the role of literary and textual traditions in the record and transfer 
of military knowledge. The investigative chapters (6 and 7) present the sporadic dip-
lomatic contacts and interactions of these remote superpowers as well as the interme-
diary role of the nomadic confederacies and empires that lay between them. Finally, 
the author explains the comparable features and convergences of these two separate 
military systems, which had similar adaptive answers to nomadic threats.
The  historiographical  essay  on  the  relationship  between  war  and  culture  
explores  the  question  of  how  the  contents  of  a  seventh-century  Chinese  and  a  
European  military  manual  could  be  so  similar  despite  the  vast  geographical  dis-
tance.  Since  the  mid-twentieth  century,  a  belief  in  general  principles  of  war  was  
replaced by a cultural-historical approach that studied various ways of war and stra-
tegic cultures. The most prominent military historian of our day, John Keegan, even 
described  war  as  an  “expression  of  culture.”6  The notion  of  a  Western  way  of  war 
as a particular and timeless European type of warfare deriving from the tactics of 
ancient Greeks hoplites and characterized by quick problem solving, decisive bat-
tle,  and frontal  attacks7  stems from this  culture-centric  approach.  Its  counterpart,  
the Oriental way of war  was characterized by “evasion, delay and indirectness” by 
Keegan.8  The  information  obtained  from  the  two  main  sources  presented  by  this  
book contradict this static framework. During the seventh century, Chinese warfare 
was too western and aggressive,  while the Byzantine way of war proved to be too 
Asian and defensive, which questions the exactness of these categories. In his book, 
Graff cut the Gordian knot and introduced the term Eurasian way of war.
The two empires, the Sui/Tang China and the Eastern Roman Empire, possessed 
similar resources, and their territories and populations were comparable; the main dif-
ference between them was their geographic layout. China was basically a continental 
2 May, “Review of The Eurasian Way of War.”
3 Skaff, “Review of The Eurasian Way of War.”
4 Decker, “Review of The Eurasian Way of War.”
5 Davies, “Review of The Eurasian Way of War.”
6  Keegan,  History of Warfare, 12.
7  Hanson,  Western Way of War; Hanson, Carnage and Culture. 
8  Keegan,  History of Warfare, 387–88.
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power  with  limited  use  of  the  navy,  while  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire  surrounded  
the Mediterranean Sea, which resulted in its having a powerful fleet that was able to 
exploit its long and articulated coastline. The geostrategic considerations addressed in 
the book are difficult to grasp, however, because of the lack of maps. The two empires 
also differed in the number and organization of soldiers: China introduced the system 
of part-time military service (fubing) in the Warring States period, while the Byzantine 
Empire formed a permanent and professional army smaller in number. At the same 
time, the expeditionary troops numbered between 12,000 and 20,000 in both areas.
The armies of these two states used weaponry on a similar technological level; 
the only significant exception was the frequent Chinese use of handheld crossbows. 
At the same time, at  the end of the sixth century,  several  types of military equip-
ment appeared in the East Roman army as well as in early Avar burials. These arte-
facts—lamellar armor,9 traction trebuchets, and single-edged ring-pommel swords10 
(wrongly  described  as  sabers  in  the  book)—were  formerly  unknown  in  western  
Eurasia  while  frequently  used in  ancient  China.  The two military  manuals  report  
on similar tactical elements, and risk calculations played a comparable role in the 
military decisions of both states.
Campaigns relied on fundamental logistical planning like transfer, accommo-
dation, and food supply. The author’s comparison of Chinese and Byzantine logis-
tics, however, fails in the absence of recent and relevant literature on the logistical 
support of the East Roman Empire.11 He ascribes the poor logistics of the Byzantine 
Empire to the damaged roads and lack of  distribution centers for supplies,  which 
contrasted with the canals that interlaced Tang China. In fact, a dense network of 
fortresses and fortified cities with granaries served the logistical needs of the East 
Roman army between the fourth and seventh centuries. Fortifications were not only 
designed for passive defense but also for an active distribution of the food supply.12 
The Danube as  the  main artery  of  riverine  transport  compensated for  the  lack of  
canals  in  the  frontier  zone.13  The  author  rightly  argues  that  fortresses  and  sieges  
played a  significant  role;  however,  some minor  inaccuracies  occur  in  his  descrip-
tions of major sieges.14
9  Bugarski,  “Contribution”;  Glad,  “Empire’s  Influence  on  Barbarian  Elites”;  Glad,  L’armement, 
113–27. 
10  Csiky,  Avar-Age Polearms, 233–34; in the Byzantine context: Justiniana Prima (Caričin Grad, a 
church’s crypt): Quast, “Einige alte und neue Waffenfunde,” 361; Glad, L’armement, 319, 324.
11  Haldon,  General Issues; Whately, “Organisation”; Sarantis, “Military Provisionining.”
12 Sarantis, “Waging War in Late Antiquity,” 36–40.
13 On the Danube fleet and transport: Bounegru and Zahariade, Les forces navales; Karagiorgou, 
“LR2”; Curta, “Amphorae and Seals.”
14 The author attributes the Avar siege of Constantinople in the summer of 626 also to the Persians 
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The  seventh-century  Chinese  and  Byzantine  military  practice  matched  even  
modern  expectations  in  terms  of  organization,  discipline,  and  risk  management.  
This consciousness derived from the accumulation of several generations of experi-
ence passed on in the literary and textual traditions that characterized both bureau-
cratic  empires.  Both  states  had  a  great  tradition  of  writing  military  manuals  that  
were used and even brought to campaigns by generals. The administrations of both 
armies kept a large number of records, lists, and reports. These documents survived 
only as paper fragments from the Western Regions of Tang China or in the form of 
late antique papyruses from Egypt. These living traditions inherited from Antiquity 
led to the continuous development of armies and generalship. 
The vast distance between China and the Mediterranean calls into serious ques-
tion all historical comparisons between these remote areas; however, the two empires 
were aware of each other and had diplomatic and commercial relations beginning in 
the Han-period. These accidental and sparse encounters and the blurred and uncer-
tain information they had on each other limited the spread of military innovations. 
Both empires had close contacts with their northern nomadic neighbors (the 
Türks  and Avars),  who provided a  link via  the  Eurasian steppe zone between the 
East and West. After reviewing sources and literature on the origin of the Avar elite 
and enumerating, based on the Strategikon, a series of East Asian military innova-
tions adopted by the Byzantines, the author concludes the Avars,15 migrating from 
Inner Asia, acted as a transmission vector of East Asian technology.
The description of Avar-Byzantine interactions contains several inaccuracies. 
The  development  of  the  saber  cannot  be  dated  to  the  period  of  Avar  migration  
(mid-sixth  century);  it  was  a  process  that  occurred  approximately  hundred  years  
later.16 Moreover, the paramerion, interpreted as a single-edged sword or saber, was 
a  weapon  of  the  Middle  Byzantine  period  (ninth–tenth  centuries).17  The  Chinese  
origin of P-shaped suspension loops is highly questionable since they appear con-
temporary with the European specimens at the end of the sixth century in China.18 
Ring-pommel swords represent a new element in the list of weapons of Asian origin: 
such swords were frequent in the burials of the early Avar elite from the Danube-
Tisza Interfluve (Central Hungary) and had no local precedents. At the same time, 
located on the  Asian side  of  the  Bosporus,  although they  could  not  have  participated in  the  
siege: Hurbanič, Avar Siege of Constantinople in 626,  205–7.
15 New palaeogenetic data on the origin of the Avar elite: Csáky, “Genetic Insights.”
16  Csiky,  Avar-Age Polearms, 192–214, 318–25. 
17  Haldon,  “Some  Aspects  of  Byzantine  Military  Technology,”  31;  Theotokis,  “Military  
Technology,” 448–49.
18 The earliest P-shaped suspension loop from China is dated to 569: Koch, “Überlegungen,” 574; 
Csiky, Avar-Age Polearms, 311–14.
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this weapon type had been popular in China since the fourth century, and new Inner 
Asian finds confirm the possibility of Avar transmission.19
Lamellar armor and stirrups were in use in China long before their arrival in 
Europe  around  the  formation  of  the  Avar  Qaghanate  in  the  Danube  Basin.20  Like  
other researchers, Graff regards the European appearance of the traction trebuchet 
a  result  of  Avar  transmission.  The exact  date  of  the  adoption of  stirrups  and trac-
tion trebuchets by the Byzantines is not as clear. Stirrups, while first mentioned in 
Maurice’s Strategikon, are not listed there among the innovations of Avar origin; the 
work does not even emphasize their novelty. Moreover, archaeological evidence from 
the Balkans indicates that stirrups were in wide use among the Byzantines at the end 
of the sixth century, although their shape and manufacturing technique distinguished 
them from stirrups found in Avar burials.21 According to some philological analyses 
of the Strategikon, Byzantines used stirrups in the first half of the sixth century.22
Traction  trebuchets  replaced  early  Roman  torsion  artillery,  especially  the  
onager, offering a simpler technique, larger projectiles, and a greater range. The early 
sixth-century sources  refer  to this  siege engine as  a  helepolis,  which was used by 
the Byzantine army even before the arrival of the Avars to Europe.23 Theophylact’s 
anecdote about Bouzas, a Byzantine traitor at the siege of Appiaria who allegedly 
taught the Avars how to build siege engines, reveals further contradictions. Besides 
the literary topoi included in the story, it points to the fact that not only the Avars 
used such siege engines earlier, but also the Eastern European Kutrigurs preceding 
them.24  Traction trebuchets  were already known in the Arabian Peninsula  in the 
early seventh century,25 which questions the hypothesis that transmission occurred 
through the steppe and suggests the transfer of Near Eastern technology was via 
the Sasanians.
Graff regards  the  Avar  transmission of  the  mentioned weapons and military 
equipment as proved. However, he refuses to consider the possibility of a nomadic 
mediation of tactical elements and ideas because of the lack of literacy among the 
Avars. Furthermore, the direction, date, and way of transmission of these weapons 
and military equipment are also uncertain.
19  Csiky,  Avar-Age Polearms, 233–34, 315–18.
20 On Chinese lamellar armor: Dien, “Study of Early Chinese Armor”; Csiky, “Transformation of 
Horse Riding.”
21 Bugarski, “Ostava iz Streževa”; Ivanišević and Bugarski, “Les étriers byzantins.”
22 Kraft, “Lat.-griech. scala”; Šuvalov, “Dva železnych stremeni.”
23  Petersen,  Siege Warfare, 411.
24 Kardaras, “Episode of Bousas (586/7).”
25  Chevedden,  “Artillery  of  King  James  I”;  Chevedden,  “Hybrid  Trebuchet”;  Petersen,  Siege 
Warfare, 406–29.
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In the  final  chapter  of  his  book,  David A.  Graff formulates  a  comprehensive 
thesis  according  to  which  not  only  was  the  military  equipment  of  the  armies  in  
Sui/Tang  China  and  the  Byzantine  Empire  in  the  sixth-seventh  centuries  similar,  
but so too were their tactics, the logistics of their campaigns, and even their long-
term strategic targets. Graff ascribed these common points to the similar challenges 
these empires faced. Throughout their history, both empires confronted the troops 
of nomadic confederacies of the Eurasian steppe, which determined their weaponry, 
tactics, and strategic thought, which were partly conveyed in their literary traditions 
and partly used by the nomadic federates (or mercenaries) serving in their armies.
Nomadic art of war fundamentally influenced Byzantine and Chinese warfare 
and transformed the armies of both empires. However, these two states experienced 
these impacts in different ways, and not only nomads impacted their military affairs. 
The biggest difference between China and Byzantium resulted from the three-hun-
dred-year-long fragmentation before Li Jing, a period that was characterized by non-
Han, nomadic rule in northern China. Barbarian rule was manifest not only in the 
imperial family and the power of a small elite but in the appearance of several nomad 
groups that had immigrated to the empire and acculturated to the Chinese civiliza-
tion while still  preserving their language, customs, and way of war.26  The position 
of this barbarian elite is comparable to the Germanic kingdoms on the ruins of the 
West Roman Empire. These rulers accepted their dependence on the (East or West) 
Roman emperor,27 while northern barbarians in China founded imperial dynasties. 
In  contrast,  the  East  Roman  Empire  maintained  its  Roman  imperial  power,  legal  
system,  and  culture,  as  well  as  its  Greek  language  and  Christian  religion.  In  this  
empire, the army employed nomadic cavalry only as federates and experienced sig-
nificant Germanic influence on its military affairs.
Ignoring the fundamental political, social, and cultural differences between the 
two empires, the author emphasizes religion and human resources as distinguishing 
factors. The Christian Byzantine Empire provided strong ideological support for its 
armed  forces,  while  China’s  enormous  human  resources—enabling  massive  inva-
sions of Korea or the Türk Qaghanate—compensated for its religious fragmentation. 
Following  Luttwak,28  Graff  characterizes  the  Byzantine  “grand strategy”  as  one  of  
diplomacy,  bribery,  and alliance-building,  which was  only  valid  for  some periods 
and regions. The Byzantine Empire’s responses to various threats29 was shaped by the 
26  Dien,  Six Dynasties Civilization; Lewis, China between Empires, 54–85; Holcombe, “Xianbei in 
Chinese History”; Dien and Knapp, Cambridge History of China 2. 
27 Scholl, “Imitatio Imperii?.”
28  Luttwak,  Grand Strategy.
29 Sarantis, “Waging War in Late Antiquity.”
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ever-changing combinations of imperial ambitions and regional strategies instead of 
an overarching vision or grand strategy.
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